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NSC/ExCom/BER-NATO

RECORD OF MEETING NO. 1
11 hours, 24 October 1962

1. Provision of Information to Allies.

a. Low altitude photos of Cuban missile sites should be given to quadripartite Allies at Ambassadorial meeting, 24 October 1962. [REDACTED]

b. Mr. Nitze will talk to the three Ambassadors alone, 24 October, on possible actions that might be taken against missile sites.

c. The NAC should be kept informed through Ambassador Finletter. This can best be done after each Ambassadorial meeting when a message to the U.S. Permanent Representative is sent. The delay in transmission time is acceptable and consistent with the need to maintain maximum security. Policy: since we expect NATO to help in this crisis, the US must keep its Allies informed in advance. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel)

d. The channel to inform the OAS is through the debriefings by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson.

e. [REDACTED]

f. Consensus was to provide the Military Committee as much information as the NAC receives. The security problem may present some problems, but the general aura or philosophy behind actions to be taken (rather than precise information) should be given to the Military Committee. (Action: General Twitchell)

g. With regard to a possible political problem in Europe (some elements may blame the US for the Berlin crisis), the US should emphasize that the Soviets actions in Cuba led to a heightened Berlin crisis, and that if we had not acted toward the current Cuban situation the Berlin crisis would have been much worse. Consensus was to conduct a background briefing on a broad basis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Action: Ambassador Thompson will discuss with Secretary Rusk)

2. Functions of the Sub-Committee.

The President desires this group of officials to focus on the combined crises of Berlin and Cuba. The Sub-Committee may not act on a day-to-day basis, but it must tie together long range policies and day-to-day operations. In addition, there may be items from the NSC meetings which this Sub-Committee may need to address urgently.

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Partially Declassified/Released on 6-14-88
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F88-640)
by N. Menan, National Security Council

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3. Evacuation of Dependents from Moscow.

This proposal was discussed briefly. (Action: Ambassador Thompson to have paper prepared for agenda)

4. Nuclear Cooperation with France.

An OSD paper was tabled for subsequent consideration. (Action in State: Mr. Schaetzel)

5. Soviet Inspection of US Traffic to Berlin.

Considerable discussion on inspection included: question of linking Cuba and Berlin, need to include both East Berlin and West Berlin, requirement to coordinate with FRG, problem of possible blockage or inspection of traffic of all three Powers versus that of the US alone, the tail-gate problem in that the current UK and US practices are different, the possibility of Soviet demands to inspect rail traffic, and the question of "elbow room" or face-saver for the Soviets.

Consensus was that the US should not initiate this subject, but should be prepared for it if it comes up in the UN or elsewhere. A new paper will be prepared. (Action: Mr. Hillenbrand, State)



8. US Build-up in the Berlin Crisis.

An OSD paper was tabled. A short paper should be prepared to answer the President's question concerning the possibility of build-up in Europe if forces are frozen for Cuban contingency plans. This paper will request authority to initiate exploratory discussions with our quadripartite Allies. (Action: Mr. Nitze)

9. Economic Countermeasures.

The readiness of governments, US and Allied, to implement economic

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countermeasures was reviewed. State will prepare a paper on status of readiness of Allied governments. (Action: Mr. Schaezel, State)

10. Breaking of Diplomatic Relations.

The possibility that the Soviets may break relations with the US was briefly discussed. Two questions arise: a. Would the US want its Allies to break relations with the USSR? b. Would the US want to break relations with the satellites? These questions require study [REDACTED]

(Action: Ambassador Thompson; and General Twitchell [REDACTED])

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